History of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 in Timeline

Alaska Airlines Flight 261, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, crashed into the Pacific Ocean near Anacapa Island, California, on January 31, 2000, killing all 88 people aboard. The flight was en route from Puerto Vallarta to Seattle, with a stop in San Francisco, and was attempting to divert to Los Angeles due to mechanical issues. The crash resulted from a catastrophic loss of pitch control. The incident prompted significant investigation and changes in aircraft maintenance procedures.

1981: Captain Thompson joined Alaska Airlines

In 1981, Captain Ted Thompson joined Alaska Airlines. He had accrued 17,750 flight hours, and had more than 4,000 hours experience flying MD-80s.

1984: First Officer Tansky joined Alaska Airlines

In 1984, First Officer William "Bill" Tansky joined Alaska Airlines. He had accumulated 8,060 hours as first officer on the MD-80.

1985: Progressive Increase in Maintenance Intervals

Starting in 1985, Alaska Airlines progressively increased the period between jackscrew lubrication and end-play checks, with the approval of the FAA. Each subsequent missed lubrication or check represented a missed opportunity to adequately maintain the jackscrew or detect excessive wear.

1992: Delivery of the Aircraft

In 1992, the McDonnell Douglas MD-83 aircraft, with serial number 53077 and registered as N963AS, was delivered. It had logged 26,584 flight hours and 14,315 cycles before the crash.

1996: Extension of Lubrication Intervals

In 1996, an FAA inspector testified that Alaska Airlines submitted documentation from McDonnell Douglas as justification for the extension of lubrication intervals. However, the investigation could not determine what specific information was presented by Alaska Airlines to the FAA prior to 1996 regarding these extensions.

September 1997: Inaccurate End-Play Check

In September 1997, the last end-play check on the aircraft did not uncover excessive wear on the jackscrew assembly, because Alaska Airlines had fabricated nonstandard tools for the check. These tools could result in inaccurate measurements, which would have indicated the need to replace the affected components had accurate measurements been obtained.

1997: Boeing Acquired McDonnell Douglas

In 1997, Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas through a merger. Boeing and Alaska Airlines eventually accepted liability for the crash of AS261, and most lawsuits by family members were settled out of court. The total settlement amount exceeded US$300 million, covered by insurance, with individual settlements ranging from a couple million dollars up to $20 million.

1997: Liotine's Recommendation Overruled

In 1997, John Liotine recommended that the jackscrew and gimbal nut of the accident aircraft be replaced, but his recommendation was overruled by another supervisor.

December 22, 1998: Federal Authorities Raided Alaska Airlines Property

On December 22, 1998, federal authorities raided an Alaska Airlines property and seized maintenance records. This action was related to information provided by mechanic John Liotine about supervisors approving maintenance records improperly.

August 1999: Alaska Airlines Placed Liotine on Paid Leave

In August 1999, Alaska Airlines put John Liotine, the mechanic who reported maintenance record falsification, on paid leave.

September 1999: Inadequate Lubrication of Jackscrew Assembly

In September 1999, the Alaska Airlines mechanic who performed the last lubrication of the jackscrew assembly at SFO did not adequately perform the task, taking only about one hour when the aircraft manufacturer estimated it should take four hours. Laboratory tests indicated that the excessive wear of the jackscrew assembly could not have accumulated in just the four-month period between the September 1999 maintenance and the accident flight, leading the NTSB to conclude that more than just the last lubrication was missed or inadequately performed.

January 31, 2000: Crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261

On January 31, 2000, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, crashed into the Pacific Ocean near Anacapa Island, California, due to a catastrophic loss of pitch control while attempting to divert to Los Angeles International Airport. All 88 people on board, including passengers and crew, died in the accident.

April 2000: NTSB Special Inspection of Alaska Airlines

In April 2000, a special inspection by the NTSB of Alaska Airlines revealed widespread significant deficiencies that "the FAA should have uncovered earlier". The investigation concluded that FAA surveillance of Alaska Airlines had been deficient for several years.

2000: Liotine Filed a Libel Suit

In 2000, John Liotine filed a libel suit against Alaska Airlines following his allegations of maintenance record falsification.

2000: Memorial Vigil at the Space Needle

In 2000, as part of a memorial vigil, a column of light was beamed from the top of the Space Needle in Seattle to commemorate those affected by the disaster. Students and faculty at John Hay Elementary School held a memorial for four students killed in the crash.

April 2001: Dedication of the John Hay Pathway Garden

In April 2001, John Hay Elementary School in Seattle dedicated the "John Hay Pathway Garden" as a permanent memorial to the students and their families who were killed on Flight 261. The City of Seattle also renovated Soundview Terrace in honor of the Pearson and Clemetson family members who perished, naming the playground "Rachel's Playground".

July 2001: FAA Panel Determination of Corrective Actions

In July 2001, an FAA panel determined that Alaska Airlines had corrected previously identified deficiencies. However, the NTSB questioned the depth and effectiveness of these corrective actions and the overall adequacy of Alaska Airlines' maintenance program.

December 2001: Federal Prosecutors Declined to File Criminal Charges

In December 2001, federal prosecutors stated that they would not file criminal charges against Alaska Airlines. Around this time, Alaska Airlines agreed to settle the libel suit with John Liotine by paying about $500,000, and Liotine resigned.

2001: NASA Recognition of Jackscrew Risk

In 2001, NASA recognized the risk to its hardware dependent on similar jackscrews and developed an engineering fix with United Space Alliance. The fix promised to improve the identification of progressive failures through visual inspections, depth measuring tools, and electronic or mechanical wear monitors. It also included a redesigned fail-safe jackscrew concept incorporating a redundant follower nut.